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Abstract: The increasing share of the top fractile in the earnings distributions of several Anglo-
Saxon heritage economies since the 1970s has been dramatic, and well documented. To date,
however, little is known about the socio-economic origins and gender composition of the very top
tail in the modern era. This paper takes a first step in filling some of the holes in our knowledge.
We  use a tax-filer data base for Canada for the period 1983-2003 that contains about eighty
million observations. We show first that male earners in the top one thousandth of the distribution
come very disproportionately from families with incomes in the top decile. In contrast, individuals
in the remaining part of the top centile have more dispersed socio-economic origins. Second we
show that female participation in the top fractiles has been very low, and that growth in
participation has been slow yet definite. In contrast, female earnings in this echelon are almost
on par with male earnings. Third, we show that there is an enormous asymmetry between the
genders when it comes to spousal earnings: high-earning women have very high-earning spouses,
but not vice versa. ‘Secondary males’ have earnings levels almost ten times as high as ‘secondary
females’, suggesting that, even at this extremely elevated earnings level there is truth to the
adage about who lies ‘behind’ successful individuals. Finally, it is illustrated that the earnings
concentration that has characterised the last three decades did not change with the end of the
‘tech boom’ in the year 2000.
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T
he recent growth in share of the very top fractiles of the income
distribution in Anglo-Saxon heritage economies has been truly
remarkable. Saez and Veall (2005) show that the pattern of gain has been
broadly similar in the United Stated and Canada, with the latter lagging
slightly: the wage-income share of the top 1 per cent has approximately
doubled from 6 per cent to 12 per cent over the period 1975 to 2000, and the
share of the top 0.1 per cent has approximately quadrupled over the same time
frame – from just over 1 per cent to 5 per cent. These patterns are illustrated
in Figures 1 and 2, which are taken from Saez and Veall.
Atkinson (2005) and Atkinson and Leigh (2004) have shown that a similar
pattern characterises the data for the UK, Australia and New Zealand, though
the trends in the Antipodes have not been quite so strong. A recent paper for
Ireland – another primarily English-speaking economy – by Nolan (2005)
indicates a pattern of top fractile growth similar to the economies examined by
Atkinson and Leigh. Piketty and Saez (2003) initially charted the patterns for
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Figure 1: Top Decile Shares, Canada
Source: Saez and Veall (2005).the US. In contrast, many other studies have found no such pattern in the
data for France (Piketty, 2003), Japan (Moriguchi and Saez, 2005), the
Netherlands (Atkinson and Salverda, 2005), Switzerland (Dell, Piketty and
Saez, 2005) or Spain (Alvaredo and Saez, 2005) as examples. 
Such a growth in concentration raises a number of questions about those
individuals who inhabit the very top echelon of the distribution: what is the
degree of social mobility in this world? Does there exist a ‘glass ceiling’ for
women that restricts their participation in this group? For those women who
are members of this elite, are their earnings comparable to male earnings?
What are the spousal earnings of individuals in the top fractiles? How have
these patterns evolved in recent decades? To date the literature has shed very
little light on these issues.
These questions are of interest not just to economists, but to sociologists
and public policy makers broadly defined. In the present paper we explore
these questions and succeed in providing answers with the help of a
remarkable data base composed of about 80 million Canadian tax filers. While
we obviously cannot generalise our findings to other economies, even English-
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Figure 2: Top Decile Shares, Canada and the US
Source: Saez and Veall (2005).speaking ones, our results will hopefully motivate similar investigations
elsewhere. 
But first, why are we interested? For some, the concentration of income
and/or wealth may be just the inevitable consequence of the incentives
necessary for a more efficient functioning of a market economy. If this is so,
then we could take the position that, provided the poor are not completely
destitute, there is little reason for concern: the growth in the top tail incomes
may not have been at the expense of those at the bottom in the distribution
and, therefore, any resulting increase in inequality or polarisation may not
reflect a worsening of the absolute status of the poor. 
An alternative perspective sees polarisation as potentially welfare
reducing, even if it is brought about by an increase in the distance of the top
tail from the median without increasing the distance between the median and
those in the lower tail. Increased polarisation may result in elevated crime
rates or even social disintegration in the extreme (Diamond, 2005).1 Crime
may also spread in less equal societies (Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza,
2002) because the opportunity costs to the disenfranchised fall. Rioting by
marginalised groups in France in the Autumn of 2005 was arguably a
reflection of the divide between insiders and outsiders.2
A second consequence of increasing income spreads is reduced social
mobility. Higher incomes in the upper centiles reduce the likelihood of
intergenerational income mobility as a result of bequests and trusts. Recent
evidence (Corak, 2004) suggests that social mobility in the US may now be as
low as some of ‘Old Europe’, although mobility in Canada is high, despite the
recent surge in top incomes there. Reduced mobility may also result from a
more easily acquired and financed education on the part of the offspring of
those with very high incomes.
Third, increases in income concentration at the top tail cannot but lead to
increases in the concentration of wealth. Kennickell (2001), indicates that the
top 1 per cent of the US wealth distribution now owns about 35 per cent of all
personal wealth, the next 9 per cent, owns about one-third, and the remaining
90 per cent of the population owns less than one-third. Concentrations of
wealth also lead to reduced social mobility, and an increase in political power.
Glaeser (2005) proposes that greater concentrations of wealth can increase the
lobbying and political power of those at the upper tail and thereby increase
inequality further. 
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1As an example, The Washington Post reported in September 2005 that, in Brazil, 36,000 people
had been killed with guns in 2004. Sala-i-Martin (2002) indicates that Brazil’s income distribution
not only displays much more inequality than virtually all countries at a comparable level of
development, but that it is actually bimodal.
2Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) examine the link between alienation and polarisation.Fourth, greater polarisation may decrease the demand for common public
goods. The rich may prefer gated communities built around golf courses with
their own security forces, road maintenance, and local public goods, while the
greater part of the income distribution may desire more public-school
investment.  A substantial literature (e.g., Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999)
exists on this, that shows not only does the polarisation of demands, itself
driven by income polarisation, decrease redistributive possibilities, but can
also lead to inefficient levels of human capital investment for the economy at
large.
Finally there is the question of public policy. If it is desirable to place some
limit on polarisation, or income/wealth concentration, it is necessary to
understand why and how the observed concentrations develop and change. Are
the giant shifts in shares recently observed the result of taxation policy, or
changes in social norms, or the fruits of invention, technological shocks and
luck? If public policy measures have indeed been behind these seismic shifts,
then we need to understand the linkages between public policy and
wealth/income concentrations. 
Understanding why earnings have become so concentrated at the top tail
is additionally important in view of the role that has been attributed to
technological change in the last decade. The accepted wisdom is that
technological change has been of the skill-biased type, and hence benefited
those with high skills and incomes. At the same time, the fact that only the top
1 per cent of the distribution has increased its share of total earnings in
Canada (and several of the English-speaking economies) in a substantial way,
whereas one would expect that the whole of the top decile at least would have
benefited from skill-biased technological change, raises the possibility that the
benefits of skill-biased technological change have been largely appropriated by
a very small group. Eckstein and Nagypal (2004) indicate that the returns to
education have been very non-linear, and that postgraduates, rather than
university graduates at large, have gained disproportionately in the last three
decades in the US. Postgraduates are very small in number and therefore this
pattern is consistent with what emerges from an examination of the very top
tail of the earnings distribution. 
Saez and Veall (2005) and Piketty and Saez (2003) have each proposed
that the growing share of the top fractiles can be understood best as reflecting
primarily a change in social norms – at least in Anglo-Saxon heritage
economies, rather than being attributable to a change in tax structure (as
suggested by Feldstein (1995)), the impact of skill-biased technological change,
or the spectacular growth of stock options in the nineties. 
The current paper examines the characteristics of those individuals who
compose the top echelons of the distribution. In line with recent practice, we
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top centile and in turn with the remainder of the top decile and the rest of the
population. We first focus on intergenerational mobility. Buchinsky and Hunt
(1999) have found that income mobility has lessened substantially in the US
in recent decades. They used a representative sample from the NLSY. In
contrast we investigate the extreme top tail of the distribution – though our
data do not permit us to examine how mobility has changed over time – for
reasons that will become clear in our discussion of the data. Second, we
examine the composition of the top fractiles from a gender standpoint. There
exists an extensive literature on women in the labour market, and a subset of
this focuses upon what is termed the ‘glass ceiling’ – proposing that there
exists a less visible set of obstacles to the progress of women into the very top
salary ranks. As part of this search we examine the earnings of spouses of
those in the top fractiles. In each case the novelty of the present work springs
from the fact that we examine the extreme top of the income distribution, a
focus made possible by our access to tax-based data that accurately captures
this tail.
II DATA
The Longitudinal Administrative Database (LAD) represents a 20 per cent
longitudinal sample of Canadian tax-filers constructed from Canada Customs
and Revenue Agency (CCRA – previously Revenue Canada) tax files. The first
year of data is 1983 and the LAD currently goes to 2003, thus determining the
period covered by this analysis. The relatively recent final year of the data
allows us to examine patterns in the post tech-bubble period. The LAD file
possesses on the order of five million observations per recent year, and the
work reported here is based on the full LAD base, making for generous
samples at the extremes of the distribution.
Individuals are selected into the LAD according to a random number
generator based on Social Insurance Numbers (SINs) and are followed over
the time by the same means.3 Individuals drop out of the LAD if they do not
file taxes, or if they die or emigrate, while new filers are continually added to
the database in the fixed 20 per cent of population ratio. The size of the file
has grown over time, commensurate with the growth in the underlying tax-
filing population. 
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3Individuals are tracked across any changes in their SIN, an event that characterises
approximately 3 per cent of all tax filers in any given year.The LAD’s coverage of the adult population is good since the rate of tax
filing is very high. Higher- and middle-income Canadians are required by law
to do so, while lower income individuals have incentives to file in order to
recover income tax and other payroll tax deductions made through the year
and, since 1986, to benefit from various tax credits and the National Child Tax
Benefit introduced in the nineties. The full set of tax files from which the LAD
is constructed are estimated to cover upwards of 90 per cent of the target
population, thus comparing favourably with other databases. Furthermore, a
high proportion of those not included are non-labour market participants
(older married women in particular), and it is on account of this status that
they do not file taxes.4 But from the standpoint of the present study, the LAD
has a very comprehensive coverage of those at the top end of the income
distribution. Moreover, the work of Saez and Veall is partly based on this data
set, and therefore our estimates are comparable to theirs.
The LAD includes information derived from individuals’ tax files: basic
demographic characteristics, income (sources, amounts), deductions, and tax
paid.5 Important to this analysis is the quality of the income information: the
income variable is constructed in a consistent manner over the full period we
analyse.6
When sorting individuals into family units, the main criterion is the
address of the individual(s). This means that both common law and standard
(legal) marriages are recognised. The resulting household unit therefore
corresponds closely to what is usually termed an ‘economic’ family – one that
shares resources by virtue of living at the same domicile. The data are also
characterised by a constant definition of the filing unit, unlike many other
economies’data bases, where the filing unit has changed from the family to the
individual, or gives the option of filing in either status (see, for example, the
discussion in Atkinson and Leigh (2004)). 
III SAMPLE SELECTION
Most of the samples in our analysis are constructed by imposing the
following restrictions on a year-by-year (cross-sectional) basis. First, individ-
uals had to be between 20 and 59 years of age in a given year, thus eliminating
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4See Atkinson et al. (1992) for discussion of the general advantages of administrative data of this
type over survey data in terms of sample representation, the accuracy of the information collected,
and in other ways.
5For those matched into families, information pertaining to the other family members and the
relevant family totals are appended to individuals’ records.
6For most of its surveys, Statistics Canada now attempts to gain participants’ permission to use
their tax files to gather data on incomes.many students and semi-retired workers whose earnings tend to be low and to
vary from year-to-year for their own special reasons. Second, full-time post-
secondary students were excluded (based on various tuition and other
education-related deductions) on the grounds that they have a diminished
attachment to the labour force and their earnings do not necessarily reflect
labour-market opportunities. The results of applying these selection criteria to
the 20 per cent of population LAD yielded samples for the top one thousandth
of the distribution of between two and three thousand individuals in each year.
3.1 Social Mobility
Economic and social immobility between generations is a particular
consequence of economic inequality. Societies may be more willing to tolerate
inequalities and extremes if such mobility is high rather than low. North
American economies were traditionally thought of as being more open and
mobile than the ‘old world’ economies of nineteenth-century Western Europe.
But that appears to have changed in the twentieth century. Scandinavian
economies not only have lower rates of poverty and inequality than the US and
Canada but have higher rates of intergenerational economic mobility than the
US. In addition, the Canadian and US economies have diverged where
intergenerational mobility is concerned.
Figure 3 below is from Corak (2004). It plots various intergenerational
elasticity values relating mostly the earnings of fathers and sons. Among the
three English-speaking economies, the similarity of top tail share growth
breaks down when it comes to intergenerational mobility. Elasticites for the
US and UK are substantially higher than for Canada, whose estimates lie in
the ‘Scandinavian range’. The technical details of this literature were first
mapped out by Solon (1989) and (1992). Corak emphasises that method-
ological differences explain much of the variability in the US results and,
therefore, care must be exercised in cross-country comparisons.
While the Forbes Four Hundred yields socio-economic information on a
small number of very top wealth holders, to our knowledge no work has yet
been undertaken that explicitly focuses upon the socio-economic origins of
those in the very top tail of the distribution. Since the LAD begins in the early
eighties it affords the potential to explore the backgrounds of relatively young
individuals currently in the top tail: tracing the parental income stratum of
current high earners involves locating these earners in their parental family
while they were still members of that household, which is when they were in
their late teens. Accordingly, our strategy is to take all individuals in the 
LAD falling in the age bracket 35-38 years in the year 2003, and seek to locate 
their parental ‘family market income’ decile approximately twenty years
earlier. We then compute transition probabilities for the top tail of this
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0.1 per cent.
Our strategy obviously does not uncover the family background of all the
young high-earning individuals. For example, they may come from immigrant
families who were not domiciled in Canada in the early eighties, or their
parents may not have filed a tax return in the early eighties. Table 1 contains
the first set of results. Each number in that table is rounded to a 0 or 5.
Consequently, the zero elements that appear in the top fractile column can be
interpreted as ‘small number’ rather than as a strict zero. It is evident that
low-value cells, such as those containing ‘0’or ‘5’, limit the conclusions that can
be drawn.
We  identified 370,205 individuals in the 2003 LAD sample in the age
group 35-38 years, and then attempted to locate each of these individuals in at
least one of the years 1982, 1983, 1984. Approximately half were not located
(182,865), and some of those located were living as independents rather than
in a family context (56,685). This means that the family background was
identified for about 35 per cent of the 2003 distribution of young earners. For
each year 1982, 1983, 1984 all families in the LAD were ranked by income
decile. When the family in which a 2003 earner resided was identified, the
decile rank of the family was associated with the young earner. The parental
MOBILITY AND GENDER IN EARNINGS DISTRIBUTION 157
Note: Each vertical bar represents the value of a reported earnings elasticity. 
Source: Corak (2004).
Figure 3: Intergenerational Earnings Elasticities











Inherited Earnings Advantagedecile search was started in 1984 and continued back to the earlier years if the
individual was not located in the later of the three base years. 
There are two well-known challenges in getting reliable estimates of
intergenerational income correlations. The first was initially addressed by
Solon (1992), who showed that the intergenerational earnings correlation
coefficient is biased downward if the annual observed income of the parent
differs from the parent’s permanent income. The results in Table 1 are based
on a single year’s parental income. Using multiple years for the parental
income is feasible, though it would result in a loss of sample size. Nonetheless,
there are two reasons why the bias in our results is likely minimal. First, we
use  family income rather than individual parental income or individual
parental earnings. The use of a family measure reduces the year-to-year
variation compared to an individual-based measure. In addition, income is a
broader measure of household well-being than earnings alone.
The second challenge concerns the point in the lifecycle at which the
parents are observed. Grawe (2006) shows that this is a key element in
reconciling the differing estimates of intergenerational mobility found in US
data. To address the possibility that age rather than socio-economic
background may be driving the results, we estimated the average decile age of
the parents of each of the four quantiles in Table 1 (this was not possible for
much of the very top quantile on account of the small numbers involved). Two
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Table 1: Unadjusted Transition Matrix: Parental Income – Offspring Earnings 
Offspring Earnings Quantile
Parental Family  
Market income 1–90 (low) 91–99 99.1–99.9 99.91–100 Total
Decile 1 (low) 3,700 205 15 0 3,920
Decile 2 6,200 435 30 0 6,665
Decile 3 7,395 670 35 5 8,105
Decile 4 8,435 830 65 0 9,330
Decile 5 9,655 1,020 65 10 10,750
Decile 6 10,760 1,265 95 5 12,125
Decile 7 12,595 1,665 135 10 14,405
Decile 8 15,385 2,300 180 15 17,870
Decile 9 18,320 3,405 325 25 22,075
Decile 10 (high) 19,440 5,000 815 130 25,385
Total located in 80s 111,885 16,795 1,760 200 130,630
Not observed in 80s 182,865
Observed in 80s 
not with parents 56,685
Total 2003 370,205patterns emerge from this search. First, lower-decile parents tend to be
younger than higher-decile parents, as a basic life-cycle model would predict.
Despite this, there is very minimal variation in the age of parents within a
given decile across earnings quantiles of their children: parents in a given
decile whose offspring are high earners are no different age-wise than parents
whose offspring are low earners. 
The next data challenge relates to the decile size of the located households:
Table 1 indicates that many more individuals who were 35-38 years in 
2003 were located in the upper deciles of the eighties distribution than in 
the lower deciles. This is illustrated in the final column. For example, the
ninth decile of parents contains 17 per cent of located young earners
(22,075/130,630), while the second-from-bottom decile contains just 5 per cent
(6,665/130,630). 
The lower representation from lower-decile parents means that the
offspring of such parents were less likely to be filing a tax return while still
domiciled in the parental home. Whether this means they were less likely to
work, or less likely to have an income sufficient to warrant filing, or whether
they have disproportionately left home (and hence among the 56,685
individuals we have located in this category) cannot be established. Teenagers
in Canada tend to apply for a social insurance number when they begin to
work. Despite this pattern, we show below that this differential retrieval rate
should not affect the main conclusions.
The transitions data in Table 1, unadjusted for differential retrieval rates,
indicate that the top 0.1 per cent of earners comes disproportionately from top
decile families. Of the 200 whose origins were traced, 130 come from the top
decile. Even allowing for the different retrieval rates for the parental deciles,
there is a substantial difference in the probability of a top earner coming from
the top parental decile as opposed to the ninth parental decile. The adjusted
probability is approximately four and a half times higher: if the 25 individuals
whose parents are in the ninth decile are weighted by the relative recovery
ratio (25,385/22,075) the 25 becomes 29 and therefore the relative probability
of a top one thousand earner coming from the top parental decile is 4.5 times
the probability of coming from the next decile (130/29 = 4.5). Yet the prob-
ability of coming from the ninth parental decile is not very different from the
probability of coming from any of the fifth to eighth deciles. Sample sizes here
are small and caution is obviously appropriate. 
The transition probabilities based on rescaled values are presented in
Table 2.  For illustration: the retrieval rate for decile 10 was 1.72 times the
retrieval rate for decile 7 (25,385/14,405 = 1.72). Scaling all numbers in Table
1 by their own retrieval rates and calculating the transition probabilities
based on these scaled values yields the probabilities in Table 2.
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retrieval rates, an earner in the top 0.1 per cent of the distribution has a
greater than 50 per cent probability of coming from the top decile of the
parental income distribution, but we cannot discern meaningful differences in
the probability of coming from immediately lower deciles.
In contrast, for the remainder of the top 1 per cent of the young earners
distribution, the relative probability of coming from the top parental decile is
much smaller – about twice as high as coming from the ninth decile and three
times as high as the probability of coming from the eighth decile. Proceeding
down the parental distribution, the probabilities of coming from these lower
deciles decline more smoothly than in the case of the top 0.1 per cent.
Considering finally the origins of those in the remaining nine centiles within
the top decile, the pattern is much more akin to what is observed for the 99.1
– 99.9 fractile than for the 99.91 – 100 fractile: a relatively smooth and
declining probability function.
In sum, the pattern defining the socio-economic origins of the extreme top
of the earnings distribution is different from the patterns defining the
remaining parts of the top decile of young earners. For those in the top one
thousandth of the distribution, the probability of coming from the top decile of
the parental distribution is in excess of 50 per cent, and the probabilities of
coming from other deciles do not decay smoothly as they do with the other
parts of this top earnings decile.
The sample size was not sufficiently large to permit a breakdown of these
transition probabilities between men and women. Only about 10 per cent of
the top 0.1 per cent are women. From a total of 200 individuals retrieved for
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Table 2: Transition Probabilities Adjusted for Retrieval Differentials
Offspring Earnings Quantile
Parental Family 
Market Income 1–90 (low) 91–99 99.1–99.9 99.91–100
Decile 1 (low) 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.00
Decile 2 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.00
Decile 3 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.06
Decile 4 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.00
Decile 5 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.10
Decile 6 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.04
Decile 7 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.07
Decile 8 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.09
Decile 9 0.09 0.14 0.15 0.12
Decile 10 (high) 0.09 0.18 0.32 0.53this fractile the percentage formed by women is much too small given that
individuals must be allocated across all parental deciles.
Finally, there is the possibility that the difference in retrieval rates across
parental deciles may bias the results. In Table 2 the retrieved data were scaled
assuming that the ‘missing’ individuals come from the parental distribution in
the same proportion as the observed individuals. However, it is more likely
that the ‘undiscovered’ individuals come disproportionately from the lower
parts of the parental decile. Those individuals not included in the 130,630
belong to three main groups: children of parents who migrated to Canada after
1984; children observed to be living outside of the parental household
(numbering 56,685) and a large remaining number, most of whom would have
been living in the parental household without a social insurance number.
It is difficult to say anything definite about the likely placement of those
of immigrant origin. However, for the second group – those individuals living
independently in their late teens, it is less likely that they went to university
or obtained third level education than those who continued to live in the
parental household, and therefore it is less probable that they would show up
in the top part of the earnings distribution of 35-38 year olds in 2003. The
largest missing group is likely those with no social insurance number and still
living at home in the early eighties. Since most teens in Canada obtain a SIN
when they first take a temporary job, our ‘retrieved’ individuals are likely
those who have some employment income while a teen and living at home,
while the ‘unretrieved’ individuals have not a SIN and hence unlikely to have
income as a teen. For our results to be overstated we would have to believe
that teens who have no income are more likely to be successful later in life
than teens who do have some income. Such an argument is difficult to support.
3.2 Top Fractile Representation of Women
A body of literature now exists that focuses upon wage disparities between
men and women at different parts of the distribution. A ‘glass ceiling’ is the
term that is frequently used to describe a situation when the conditional
distribution of earnings for one group – in this case women – differs from that
of another – men. Albrecht et al. (2003) is an example. They find this kind of
disparity characterises the distributions in Sweden.
While our prime interest is in the extreme top of the distribution, findings
for four components of the distribution are presented in Table 3: the top 0.1
per cent, the next 0.9 per cent, the following 9 per cent and then the ‘bottom’
90 per cent. This enables us to compare the representation of women with men
at different points at the top of the distribution. Table 3 contains the
proportion of the quantiles composed of women for a series of years between
1983 and 2003. We have computed the statistics for every year, but since the



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3numbers are not highly cyclical, just a subset of the years is presented. The
smallest sample in any year in this table is of the order of two and a half
million individuals.
The ‘female/male numbers’ column contains the percentage of each
specified quantile that is composed of females. This ratio attains a value of
0.11 for the top 0.1 per cent of the distribution in the most recent year of data
availability – 2003 – starting from 0.05 in 1983. Its ascent has been gradual,
with a stumble that coincided with the early nineties recession. The growth of
this statistic in the remaining part of this top centile has been more rapid: it
has increased from just over 0.06 to 0.20. Furthermore, the share appears not
to have been impacted by the nineties recession. The ratio in the remainder of
the top decile (excluding the top 1 per cent) has increased from 0.14 to 0.33.
(Of course, the share of females in these deciles is smaller than the foregoing
fractions, being the ratio of the number of females to the total, rather than to
the number of males).
Evidently these percentages are small, and rates of share growth are low.
At the same time it is not the case that progress is only outside of the top
centile. There may be a glass ceiling, but it is receding slowly throughout the
whole upper decile.
These participation rates tell us nothing about the distribution of male
and female earnings within the various quantiles. In particular, the very top
of the distribution is likely characterised by a heavily skewed, perhaps Pareto,
tail and it may be optimistic to believe that women and men are distributed in
the same manner throughout this tail. We have, therefore, computed the
average income level of men and women in each of the quantiles. These are
given in the next column headed ‘mean earnings’ and the following column
‘female/male earnings’ defines the relative mean earnings values.
Interestingly, the shortfall of female earnings is small and there is no strong
pattern over time for this top 0.1 per cent of earners. The same pattern holds
true for the remainder of the top centile and the remainder of the top decile.
Since the averages for women are generally below the averages for men,
the lower participation rate for women than men in essence understates what
might be termed the ‘income representation’ of women. In the poverty
literature, measures exist that capture both the rate of poverty and the income
shortfall of the poor – for example Sen (1976), Foster, Greer and Thorbecke
(1984) and Shorrocks (1995). But, to our knowledge, there are no indices that
combine these dimensions at the top of the distribution. The Sen and
Shorrocks indices are essentially the product of a headcount index and an
average income shortfall index, weighted linearly. They are not readily
adaptable to the top tail however, because the ‘excess income’ beyond a
threshold defined by a fractile boundary, relative to the threshold, is not
166 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEWconstrained to be less than one. 
A measurement solution suggests itself, which we term a ‘catch-up’ index.
This measures both the shortfall in representation of one group relative to
another in the high echelons of the distribution, and also the degree to which
the incomes of the less favoured group fall short of the incomes of the favoured
group. Define the proportion of females in the top group by Hf and the
proportion of men by Hm – analogous to the headcount measure used in
poverty analysis. Let the mean income of each group be µf and µm. Then as








is bounded between zero and one for alpha lying on the unit interval, where
alpha represents one’s aversion to representation relative to income shortfall.
The index values are given in the final columns of Table 3 for different
values of the sensitivity parameter. There is a general decline in these over
time reflecting the increased participation of women in the top fractiles. The
index that places a larger weight on earnings than participation has a value
closer to zero, indicating more equality between men and women, since the low
participation of women in these fractiles is heavily discounted.
3.3 Spousal Incomes
A frequently proposed reason for why women are under-represented in the
very top fractiles is that they have less social and familial support from their
partners. While many men in the top fractiles have female partners who are
full-time supporters and family managers, this is much less true of women.
Since the LAD contains separate information on the earnings for each
individual in the household, it is an ideal database for investigating this
hypothesis, and to establish the degree to which patterns have changed since
1982.
While tax payers file on an individual basis in Canada, the LAD also
matches individuals with their partners using a variety of matching criteria.
The samples upon which Table 4 are based include individuals in the same age
group as above, and the mean spousal earnings figures are for those spouses
who have some minimal connection with the labour market – in this case we
set a minimum earnings level of $1,000 for a spouse to be defined to have
earnings. 
The final two columns in Table 4 indicate that spousal earnings patterns
are very asymmetric in the top fractiles. Women in the top 0.1 per cent have
husbands with positive earnings in about 90 per cent of cases, and this
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Table 4: Spousal Earnings Patterns
Spousal
Quantile Quantile Mean Mean Per  Cent
Quantile Count Sum Earnings Earnings Positive
1983 F 0-90 789,500 7,300 25,500 0.88
M 0-90 389,420 1,178,920 16,600 12,400 0.36
F 90.1-99 14,305 38,300 39,300 0.87
M 90.1-99 92,500 106805 40,200 15,200 0.19
F 99.1-99.9 740 77,800 105,700 0.89
M 99.1-99.9 9,530 10,270 79,100 19,100 0.06
F 99.91-100 75 220,200 180,900 0.87
M 99.91-100 12,05 1,280 234,300 32,500 0.28
1985 F 0-90 776,520 8,600 28,600 0.88
M 0-90 409,275 1,185,795 18,700 13,600 0.45
F 90.1-99 14,965 42,800 44,800 0.86
M 90.1-99 99,010 1,139,75 44,600 16,700 0.30
F 99.1-99.9 915 87,800 108,600 0.83
M 99.1-99.9 10,410 11,325 89,100 21,700 0.23
F 99.91-100 80 291,100 410,100 0.81
M 99.91-100 1,300 1,380 277,800 38,400 0.36
1987 F 0-90 799,920 10,100 31,300 0.88
M 0-90 448,145 1,248,065 20,800 15,000 0.54
F 90.1-99 18,490 47,300 51,600 0.88
M 90.1-99 111,135 129,625 49,200 18,900 0.45
F 99.1-99.9 1,265 99,600 126,700 0.86
M 99.1-99.9 11,685 12,950 101,800 25,900 0.39
F 99.91-100 105 254,000 232,000 0.81
M 99.91-100 1,410 1,515 339,500 46,600 0.46
1989 F 0-90 842,060 12,200 35,400 0.87
M 0-90 516,380 1,358,440 23,900 17,000 0.60
F 90.1-99 21,330 55,300 65,300 0.90
M 90.1-99 128,640 149,970 57,200 22,100 0.56
F 99.1-99.9 1,515 129,000 153,200 0.89
M 99.1-99.9 13,595 15,110 133,900 32,100 0.51
F 99.91-100 145 433,900 815,700 0.93
M 99.91-100 1,590 1,735 602,300 68,700 0.52
1991 F 0-90 818,335 13,500 36,700 0.83
M 0-90 520,745 1,339,080 23,800 18,900 0.58
F 90.1-99 27,840 59,200 64,200 0.88
M 90.1-99 129,390 157,230 61,800 25,500 0.60
F 99.1-99.9 1,670 131,600 139,700 0.89
M 99.1-99.9 14,035 15,705 136,900 34,900 0.52
F 99.91-100 130 422,300 472,700 0.92
M 99.91-100 1,620 1,750 491,500 61,600 0.50
1993 F 0-90 84,5825 14,200 37,400 0.80
M 0-90 54,7790 1,393,615 24,000 20,200 0.55
F 90.1-99 34040 61700 62900 0.87
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Table 4: Spousal Earnings Patterns (contd.)
Spousal
Quantile Quantile Mean Mean Per  Cent
Quantile Count Sum Earnings Earnings Positive
1993 F 99.1-99.9 1,990 137,600 147,600 0.90
contd. M 99.1-99.9 14,850 16,840 143,700 38,000 0.55
F 99.91-100 135 490,700 430,200 0.89
M 99.91-100 1,605 1,740 546,300 66,600 0.44
1995 F 0-90 852,805 15,000 39,300 0.80
M 0-90 555,805 1,408,610 25,000 21,000 0.55
F 90.1-99 34,380 64,400 67,900 0.87
M 90.1-99 137,615 171,995 67,300 28,700 0.64
F 99.1-99.9 2,245 150,800 155,700 0.89
M 99.1-99.9 15,245 17,490 158,700 41,500 0.59
F 99.91-100 155 548,800 502,600 0.90
M 99.91-100 1,655 1,810 600,800 75,200 0.44
1997 F 0-90 870,380 16,000 41,900 0.80
M 0-90 577,000 1,447,380 26,400 22,100 0.58
F 90.1-99 35,635 68,800 77,400 0.88
M 90.1-99 139,780 175,415 71,900 30,600 0.65
F 99.1-99.9 2,515 177,600 157,100 0.89
M 99.1-99.9 15,360 17,875 185,600 46,800 0.61
F 99.91-100 160 683,500 431,000 0.88
M 99.91-100 1,710 1,870 800,800 78,600 0.48
1999 F 0-90 878,470 17,700 45,000 0.81
M 0-90 601,800 1,480,270 28,400 23,900 0.62
F 90.1-99 38,545 74,900 84,100 0.89
M 90.1-99 141,560 180,105 77,700 33,700 0.69
F 99.1-99.9 2,715 199,700 174,900 0.89
M 99.1-99.9 15,450 18,165 209,300 52,700 0.62
F 99.91-100 205 791,800 535,700 0.90
M 99.91-100 1,640 1,845 971,300 99,000 0.46
2001 F 0-90 903,460 19,700 48,800 0.83
M 0-90 638,100 1,541,560 30,800 26,000 0.67
F 90.1-99 42,545 82,700 93,000 0.90
M 90.1-99 144,105 186,650 86,000 37,300 0.72
F 99.1-99.9 3,040 233,900 210,000 0.90
M 99.1-99.9 15,525 18,565 242,000 59,600 0.62
F 99.91-100 195 1,008,700 698,800 0.90
M 99.91-100 1,690 1,885 1,180,000 102,200 0.46
2003 F 0-90 903,980 21,000 50,900 0.83
M 0-90 649,000 1,552,980 32,300 27,900 0.68
F 90.1-99 46,520 87,100 90,600 0.89
M 90.1-99 143,655 190,175 90,700 39,800 0.73
F 99.1-99.9 3,315 236,800 188,900 0.90
M 99.1-99.9 15,525 18,840 248,100 62,400 0.62
F 99.91-100 240 1,028,300 730,100 0.90
M 99.91-100 1,660 1,900 1,132,900 119,000 0.43number is relatively constant throughout the sample period. In contrast, men
have wives with positive earnings in about 50 per cent of cases in the modern
era, and a somewhat lower percentage in the early eighties. 
These patterns are broadly similar to those in the remainder of the top
percentile, though in the latter case a higher number of female spouses have
positive earnings – about 60 per cent rather than 50 per cent. But the figure
for male spouses in this fractile is similar to the male figure recorded in the
top 0.1 per cent. The first part of the conventional wisdom is therefore borne
out by these data.
The actual earnings data indicate that the asymmetry between men and
women is much more severe at the top compared with the asymmetry in the
participation rates. Women in the top 0.1 per cent of the distribution have
partners who earn about 70 per cent of the female earnings in the most recent
period, and about 100 per cent of female earnings in the eighties. For example,
in 2003 the top 0.1 per cent of women earned just in excess of one million
dollars while their partners earned about $730,000. In contrast, men in the top
0.1 per cent have spouses who, when in the labour market, earn about one-
tenth of the male figure. For example, in 2003 the respective figures were
$1.13m and $119,000.
The asymmetry is slightly less severe for the remaining part of the top
centile – men have spouses who earn about one-fifth of male earnings when
working. What these earnings figures indicate about hours of work, this data
base does not allow us to ascertain, even if it is recognised that labour supply
decisions within the household are made jointly. Nor does our data base have
any information on educational attainment, which is one marker of the degree
of ‘assortative mating’ in the population.
3.4 The Post ‘Tech Bust’ Era
As a postscript to this analysis it is worth noting that the earnings shares
of the top fractiles have not declined in the post-2000 era. If the growing share
of the top one thousandth of the distribution is being driven by the earnings
patterns of individuals working in corporations, the tech-bust of 2000 has 
not had a perceptible impact on this growth. In addition, like Saez and Veall,
we have investigated the ‘permanent’ incomes of those at the top by taking
three-year moving averages of earnings. Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994)
proposed that some of the increase in US inequality in the modern era is
attributable to a greater variance in transitory incomes. However, such an
averaging has virtually no impact on the share growth at the very top for the
whole period that we have examined, nor does it have any impact in the post-
2000 era.
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This paper investigates some of the socio-economic characteristics of the
new class of Canadian ‘super earners’ that has emerged in the last two
decades. Virtually all other English-speaking economies, including Ireland,
have also witnessed the emergence of a top group whose incomes have
increased dramatically. We have been fortunate to have at our disposal a data
base of about eighty million tax filers that has yielded large reliable samples
at the very extremity of the earnings distribution. Our principal findings are:
first, the top one thousandth of the distribution comes disproportionately from
the top decile of the parental distribution, whereas the remaining component
of the top centile is considerably more likely to have its origins in the parental
deciles below the top. Second, women have a low, but increasing, rate of
participation in the very top tail; they now form about 10 per cent of the group,
as opposed to 5 per cent in the early eighties. In contrast, the earnings of
women in this group are not so different from male earnings. Third, there is a
very severe asymmetry in the earnings patterns of male and female spouses.
About half of top male earners have working partners, whereas about 90 per
cent of top female earners have working partners. Furthermore, the earnings
of ‘secondary males’ are between five and ten times the earnings of ‘secondary
females’ in the top 0.1 per cent of the distribution. Fourth, the concentration
of earnings at the top tail is not attributable to any growth in the transitory
component of earnings, nor was there any break in this pattern with the ‘tech
bust’ of 2000.
All data bases have limitations, and the LAD is no exception. While it is
rich in the income dimension it has no information on human capital or
occupation. This clearly limits the inferences that can be drawn from it. In
addition, it is clear that we cannot say if these patterns that we have
established for Canada are mirrored in the US, the UK, New Zealand,
Australia or Ireland. But they represent a step in filling some of the holes in
our knowledge of the characteristics of those individuals and households who
inhabit the very top tail of the earnings distribution in Canada.
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